Are We Learning From Past Programs? Are We Applying Lessons Learned? by Bejmuk, Bo
   ARE WE LEARNING FROM       
        PAST PROGRAMS? 
     ARE WE APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED ? 
Bo Bejmuk 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20150009323 2019-08-31T10:37:03+00:00Z
EXAMINE SELECTED SHUTTLE LESSONS LEARNED      
     AND THEIR UTILIZATION IN CONSTELLATION  
• STRUCTURES AND LOADS ANALYSES 
• AVIONICS 
• DESIGN FOR OPERATIONS 
• MARGIN MANAGEMENT 
                  
         PRVIDE CONCLUSIONS 
                 
 
 2 
1/20/2012 
3 
1/20/2012 
OUTLINE 
• Introduction 
• System Integration Approach 
• Liftoff and Ascent Aerodynamics  
• Structures 
• Ascent Flight Control System 
• Day-of-Launch I-Loads Evolution  
• Avionics Architecture 
• Main Propulsion 
• Software 
• Lightning 
• Flight Instrumentation 
• RCS Thrusters 
• Materials and Processes 
• Risk Management 
• Operational Cost Drivers 
• Margin Management 
• Significance of Lessons Learned 
• Other Applicable Lessons Learned 
– Zenit Derived Launch System – Sea Launch 
– Delta IV – Separate Briefing 
• The Big Lesson 
Lessons learned from 
Shuttle development & 
operations can reduce 
Constellation life-cycle cost 
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Introduction  
• Two types of Shuttle Program Lessons Learned 
are addressed 
– Problems – How they were resolved and their 
applicability to Ares I 
– Success Stories – How they were achieved and their 
applicability to Ares I 
• Lessons Learned are presented at a fairly high 
level 
– Each can be expanded to any desired level of detail 
• Top-level Lessons Learned from Zenit Derived 
Launch Systems – Sea Launch are included 
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Shuttle Elements 
Ground Systems 
Solid Rocket 
Boosters (SRB) 
External Tank 
Shuttle System 
Main Engines 
Orbiter* 
*  Two cargo configurations analyzed – 
65K lbs and 0 lbs payloads 
Solid Rocket 
Motor (SRM) 
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STS-1 SRB Ignition Overpressure (IOP) 
Problem 
• SRB IOP measured at the vehicle exceeded the 3-sigma liftoff 
design environment 
– Accelerations measured on the wing, body flap, vertical tail, and 
crew cabin exceeded predictions during the liftoff transient 
– Support struts for the Orbiter’s RCS oxidizer tank buckled 
• Post flight analysis revealed that water spray designed to 
suppress SRB IOP was not directed at the source of IOP 
– Source of IOP was believed to be at the plume deflector 
– STS-1 data analysis showed the primary source located 
immediately below the nozzle exit plane 
• Tomahawk ignition transient used for preflight characteristics 
were very different from that of the SRB 
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STS-1 SRB IOP (Continued) 
Corrective Actions 
• Solution to the SRB IOP was treated as a 
constraint to STS-2 
• IOP “Wave Committee” organized with 
participation of the NASA and the contractors 
• A 6.4% model was modified to allow simulation of 
simultaneous ignitions of two SRBs with the firing 
of one motor only 
– Add a splitter plate in the flame bucket 
• A new scaling relation was developed based on 
blast wave theory 
• A series of 6.4% scale model tests were conducted 
to evaluate various concepts of IOP suppression 
schemes 
• Final fixes 
– Redirected water spray for SRB IOP suppression 
toward the “source” of SRB IOP (Figure 1) 
– Installed water troughs in the SRB exhaust duct 
– Very significant IOP reduction was achieved (Fig. 2) 
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Figure 1:  STS-1 and STS-2 SRB IOP 
Suppression Configuration 
STS-2 Configuration STS-1 Configuration 
Water spray for STS-1 
was designed for IOP  
Source at flame deflector 
Water spray at 
The flame deflector 
and side pipes 
along the duct 
Water spray at the 
side of duct deleted 
Water spray at 
the crest of the 
flame deflector 
Water troughs cover the 
SRB duct inlet 
100,000 GPM of water  
injected into the SRB 
exhaust beneath 
the nozzle exit plane 
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Figure 2:  An overall factor of 5 reduction for the primary 
IOP waves was achieved with the redesigned system 
prior to STS-2 
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STS-1 SRB IOP (Continued) 
Lessons 
1. SRB Ignition is a powerful driver in liftoff environments 
2. System Integration, responsible for liftoff environment 
definition, accepted the Tomahawk ignition test as a 
sufficient simulation of SRB ignition IOP – Did not fully 
appreciate the effect of the differences between the SRB 
and the Tomahawk ignition characteristics 
3. SRB ignition transient for Ares I should benefit from post 
STS-1 efforts on the Space Shuttle 
• MLP configuration should be evaluated to account for a single 
SRB 
• If the SRB propellant shape or type is changed, the effect on 
IOP should be re-evaluated 
DIRECT BENEFIT TO ARES LIFTOFF 
• BROAD INVOLVEMENT OF STRUCTURES/AERO 
COMMUNITY DURING SHUTTLE DEVELOPMENT-
CONTINUITY OF MSFC INVOLVMENT 
• UTILIZATION OF LEGACY HARDWARE IN ARES 
FIRST STAGE 
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Ascent Aerodynamics 
Problem 
• Plume simulation used during the preflight wind tunnel test 
program was not adequately implemented 
– Observed significant wing lift and vehicle lofting in STS-1 
• Measured strains showed negative structural margins 
• Under-predicted ascent base pressures (base drag over-
predicted) 
– Temperature effects were not modeled in cold jet  plume 
simulation parameters used during testing 
Corrective Actions 
• The Post-flight tests using hot plume simulations improved 
base and forebody pressure predictions 
• The ascent trajectory was changed to a flight with a greater 
negative angle of attack through High Q 
– The negative angle reduced wing lift 
– The negative angle had to be evaluated for Orbiter windows and 
the ET side wall pressures 
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Ascent Aerodynamics (continued) 
Lesson 
• Although the hot plume re-circulation effect is less 
significant on an axis-symmetric vehicle, it should 
be accounted for when defining pressure on the 
base and aft portion of the vehicle 
DIRECT BENEFIT LESS VISIBLE 
• SIMPLER AXISYMETRIC CONFIGURATION IN 
ASCENT 
• MSFC LESS INVOLVED IN SOLVING THIS ISSUE 
DURIND SHUTTLE DEVELOPMENT 
• SOME HOT PLUME TESTING CONTEMPLATED  
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Structures 
Problem 
• Throughout Shuttle development and the initial years of 
operations many costly structural modifications had to be 
made to maintain the required 1.4 structural safety factor 
– The Shuttle structure was designed for a 1.4 safety factor with no 
additional margin to accommodate changes occurring during the 
development phase 
Corrective Actions 
• As mathematical models and definitions of the environments 
matured, resulting changes required many hardware changes 
to eliminate areas of negative margin (below a 1.4 safety factor) 
– These hardware modifications were expensive and time 
consuming.  Additionally, they increased workload at the launch 
site 
– This tedious activity ensured safe flights and compliance with the 
safety factor requirement, however it created a significant impact 
on Shuttle operations 
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Structures (continued) 
Lessons 
• If development time is short, structural margin 
management could be pursued to avoid costly 
hardware changes as loads analyses mature 
– A suggested approach could be as follows: 
• Assign additional factor to be applied to the design loads for 
environments with the greatest uncertainties 
– For example, gravity and pressure loads could have a factor of 
1.0 but dynamic and aero loads could have a factor of 1.2 
– All factors would converge to 1.0 as a function of program 
maturity 
– A method of structural margin management could 
minimize costly hardware redesign, and program stand 
downs, but it may result in a somewhat heavier vehicle 
STRUCTURAL MARGIN MANAGEMENT 
• ARES IMPLEMENTED STRUCTURAL MARGIN 
MANAGEMENT 
• ORION IS CHALLENGED BY MASS ISSUE-
DIFFICULT TO HAVE ROBUST STRUCTURAL 
MARGIN MANAGEMENT-MASS GROWTH 
ALLOWANCE STILL IMPLEMENTED 
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Liftoff Loads Analyses 
Problem 
• Shuttle liftoff (L/O) loads were very difficult to analyze 
– Configuration complexity 
– SRB Ignition Overpressure 
– “Twang” during the SSME thrust buildup 
 Vandenberg experience showed that loss of the MLP compliance significantly 
increased L/O loads 
 Flexible washers were planned to restore compliance and avoid vehicle redesign 
 
ET/Orbiter 
axial interface 
SRB 
Growth 
H2 Tank 
Compliance 
Shuttle 
MLP 
Ares I 
SRB growth 
loads are 
transmitted 
directly to 2nd 
stage potentially 
creating more 
sever L/O loads 
Common Shuttle/Ares I 
•SRB grows 0.9” during 
ignition 
•MLP deflects 
downward 
•Forward interface 
translates upward 
 
SRB growth 
loads are 
transmitted 
directly to 
Orbiter thru H2 
Tank.  H2 Tank 
provides 
softening 
compliance 
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Liftoff Loads Analyses (continued) 
Corrective Actions 
• SRB ignition delayed until the SRB bending moment (due to 
SSME thrust buildup) was at zero 
• Four independent support posts modeled in L/O 
simulations 
• Monte Carlo method was incorporated 
• Ground wind restrictions were implemented 
 
Lesson 
• In spite of the relative configuration simplicity of the Ares I, 
L/O loads may be a significant design issue due to direct 
load path between the SRB and the upper stage 
      ARES/ORION LIFTOFF ANALYSES 
BENEFITED FROM SHUTTLE EXPERIENCE 
• MSFC INVOLVED IN LIFTOFF LOADS 
RESOLUTION – CONTINUITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
• SENSITIVITY TO MLP STIFFNESS 
• EXPERIENCE IN MODELING SRB IGNITION 
FORCING FUNCTION 
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Day-of-Launch I-Loads Update 
(DOLILU) Evolution 
Problem 
• The launch probability predictions for early Shuttle flights was less 
than 50% 
– More than half of the measured winds aloft violated the vehicle’s certified 
boundaries 
Corrective Actions 
• System Integration led the evolution from a single ascent I-load, 
through seasonal I-loads, alternate I-loads, and finally arriving at 
DOLILU 
• This process extended over a 10+ year period (Figure 3) 
• Concurrently the Program executed 3 load cycles (Integrated Vehicle 
Baseline Characterization - IVBC) combined with hardware 
modifications to expand vehicle certified envelopes (Figure 4) 
• Current launch probability is well in excess of 95% 
Lesson 
• Commit to a DOLILU approach during early development 
– Significantly improves margins 
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Figure 3:  Ascent Design Operations Evolution 
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Lesson Learned:   Reliance on Operations Process 
 to Maintain Margin is Expensive 
Certification Violations 
Ascent Operations 
Overhead 
DAY OF LAUNCH I-LOADS METHODOLOGY          
IS STATE OF THE ART TODAY 
• PLANNED FOR CONSTELLATION ASCENT 
FLIGHTS 
• WINDS ALOFT WILL HAVE LESS EFFECT ON 
STRUCTURAL WEIGHT 
• MORE ROBUST VEHICLE  
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Avionics Architecture 
Problem 
• Prevention of loss of vehicle/crew or mission due to avionics 
failures considering mission duration up to approximately 12 days 
Actions 
• Dissimilar solutions (primary, backup and two fault tolerance in 
avionics hardware/software) 
• Establishment of SAIL – Simulation of hardware/software 
interaction 
• Four LRU Mid Value Select (MVS) implemented with appropriate 
cross strapping to ensure two fault tolerance 
• The Redundancy Scheme was required to be test verified 
• Two fault tolerance became an avionics system “mainstay” on the 
Shuttle Orbiter 
Lesson 
• The Orbiter system provided a reliable avionics system.  For a 
short duration, missions such as Ares I ascent suggested a 
tradeoff to be performed between one and two fault tolerance.  
Overall system reliability could be used in the evaluation. 
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1st Stage (SRB) 2nd  Stage  SM 
Avionics Architecture (Continued) 
• The Shuttle approach of two fault tolerance* was robust, but 
may be excessive for a boost only vehicle.  The overall 
system reliability (for example 0.999) should drive 
redundancy requirements. 
*  With some compromises 
Orion 
High Time 
Exposure 
Low Time 
Exposure 
• Trade off study suggested:  One vs. 
two fault tolerance on Booster 
• A “tailored” level of fault tolerance 
could emerge as the best solution 
• Establishing the Fault Tolerance Requirements is a Primary 
Avionics Cost Driver 
CONSTELLATION IS USING “TAILORED 
APPROACH” 
• LOC/LOM DRIVES REDUNDANCY 
• ORION MASS/ARES PERFORMANCE ISSUE 
CONSTRAINS REDUNDANCY 
• SOME CONCERNS ABOUT ROBUSTNESS OF 
AVIONICS 
• LIMITED REDUNDANCY EXPECTEDTO INCREASE 
LIFE CYCLE COST 
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Initial Naive Concept of Operations 
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Operational Reality 
NASA, KSC Photo, dated September 25, 1979, index number “KSC-79PC-500” 
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Operational Cost Drivers 
Problem 
• Insufficient definition of operational requirements during 
development phase 
– Concentration on performance requirements but not on operational 
considerations 
– Shuttle design organizations were not responsible for operational cost 
– Very few incentives for development contractors 
Corrective Actions 
• Very labor intensive (high operational cost) vehicle was developed 
and put into operations 
Lesson 
• Must have the Concept of Operations defined 
• Levy the requirements on contractors to support the Concept of 
Operations 
• Must have continuity and integration between designers, ground 
operations, and flight operations requirements during the 
developmental phase  
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Launch Platform 
Courtesy of the Sea Launch Company 
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Assembly and Command Ship 
Courtesy of the Sea Launch Company 
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Sea Launch Operations  
• Integration of rocket stages 
and payload at home port in 
Long Beach, CA 
• Launches performed from the 
Equator, 154 degrees west 
(south of Hawaii)  
Ground Processing 
Team 
Launch  
Team* 
Americans 
Russians 
Ukrainians 
Norwegians 
80 
200 
50 
75 
40 
140 
50 
70 
Totals 405 300 
* Launch Team is a subset of the Ground Processing Team;  Ground 
Processing team members that are not required to participate in launch at 
sea are sent back to their companies and are off the Sea Launch payroll 
Small Team performs ground checkout and launch 
Courtesy of the Sea Launch Company 
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Lessons Learned from Sea Launch 
• Zenit extremely automated launch vehicle  
– Very little interaction with crew during checkout, pre-launch, and 
flight 
• Single string accountability, no duplications of effort (to 
some extent driven by export compliance restrictions) 
• Low operational cost benefited from original design criteria 
of Zenit 
– Rollout to pad, fuel and launch in 90 minutes 
– Allows very little time for ground or flight crew involvement  
– Imposes requirements for automatic processes 
DESIGN FOR COST EFFECTIVE OPERATION 
             ONLY PARTLY SUCCESSFUL    
 
       • ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP “STRETCH GOALS” 
• TIGHT ORION MASS/ARES PERFORMANCE ISSUE 
INHIBITED IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIONAL 
FEATURES 
• NASA DOES NOT HAVE DESIGN-FOR-
OPERATIONS ADVOCACY WITH STRENGTH 
EQUAL TO OTHER TECHNICAL DISCIPLINES 
• OPERABILITY MUST BE ADDRESSED MORE 
VIGOROUSLY TO ENSURE VIABILITY OF THE 
VISION  
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Structural and Ascent Performance Margin 
Management 
Problem 
• Unrealistic ascent performance requirements eliminated the 
possibility of effective margin management 
– DOD insisted on 32K lbs polar orbit capability 
• Equivalent to 65K lbs due East 
– NASA needed DOD support of the Shuttle Program 
• Continuous pursuit of the elusive 65K lbs due East ascent 
capability precluded the possibility of holding back some 
structural margin to avoid costly redesign changes as Program 
development matured 
• Prior to performance enhancement program the Shuttle had an 
ascent performance shortfall of ~10K lbs 
Actions Taken 
• All priorities were subordinated to the quest for ascent 
performance 
– Very few features supported effective operations  
– Costly structural modifications to maintain the required factor of 
safety were made 
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Structural and Ascent Performance Margin 
Management (continued) 
Lesson 
• Set realistic ascent performance requirements 
– Hold back some margin to be used for problem areas 
• Use factors on “not well understood” environments to 
protect against costly design modifications as Program 
knowledge matures 
• Transition to operations should be made consistent with 
vehicle operational capabilities imbedded in the design 
 
CONSTELLATION ONLY PARTLT BENEFITTED    
FROM SHUTTLE EXPERIENCE  
• ORION MASS/ARES PERFORMANCE SHOW VERY 
TIGHT MARGINS EARLY IN DESIGN CYCLE 
• TIGHT MARGINS WILL CONTINUOUSLY BURDEN 
THE DESIGNERS OF FLIGHT SYSTEMS AS THE 
DESIGN MATURES 
• VIGILANT MANAGEMENT OF MASS AND 
PRFORMANCE THREATS WILL BE REQIRED 
• STRUCTURAL MARGIN MANAGEMENT IS MORE 
ROBUST 
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The Painful Reality 
• At least 2 critical design flaws existed in Shuttle 
flight system through design, testing and flight 
testing 
– Not detected or acknowledged as major problems 
• A gap existed between actual and perceived state 
of vehicle robustness and safety 
• Although strong indications were present, neither 
the design nor the operations team identified the 
problem 
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Avoid Repeating History 
• Learn about the past 
• Develop and maintain a strong System Engineering 
& Integration team throughout the program life cycle 
• Empower engineering to challenge the Projects and 
Program on issues of design flaws and interaction 
between the elements 
– Continuously monitor performance and safety throughout 
the transition to operations and the operations phase 
• Cultivate culture of respect for descending opinions 
• Transition to operations should be made consistent 
with vehicle operational capabilities imbedded in the 
design 
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The Big Lesson 
• We were not as smart as we thought we were 
• Knowledge capture initiatives are helping – 
but should be practiced as a “contact sport”        
• If we want simple and cost effective 
operations we must design for operations 
– Shuttle designed for performance and cost 
–  Constellation needs more emphasis on design for 
operations 
– NASA is in control of operations destiny- short 
window of opportunity 
 
